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I. THE MAN ON THE TRAIN
Anne Michaels’s 1996 novel  Fugitive Pieces contains the following 
parable:
A respected rabbi is asked to speak to the congregation of 
a neighbouring village.  The rabbi,  rather famous for his 
practical  wisdom, is  approached for advice wherever he 
goes. Wishing to have a few hours to himself on the train, 
he  disguises  himself  in  shabby  clothes  and,  with  his 
withered posture, passes for a peasant. The disguise is so 
effective  that  he  evokes  disapproving  stares  and 
whispered insults from the well-to-do passengers around 
him. When the rabbi arrives at his destination, he’s met by 
the  dignitaries  of  the  community  who  greet  him  with 
warmth  and  respect,  tactfully  ignoring  his  appearance. 
Those  who  ridiculed  him  on  the  train  realize  his 
prominence  and  their  error  and  immediately  beg  his 
forgiveness. The old man is silent. For months after, these 
Jews—who, after all, consider themselves good and pious 
men—implore  the  rabbi  to  absolve  them.  Finally,  when 
almost a year has passed, they come to the old man on 
the Day of Awe when, it is written, each man must forgive 
his  fellow.  But  the rabbi  refuses to  speak.  Exasperated, 
they finally raise their voices: How can a holy man commit 
such a sin—to withhold forgiveness on this day of days? 
The rabbi  smiles seriously.  ‘All  this  time you have been 
asking the wrong man. You must ask the man on the train 
to forgive you.’
Of course it’s every peasant whose forgiveness must 
be sought. But the rabbi’s point is even more tyrannical: 
nothing  erases  the  immoral  act.  Not  forgiveness.  Not 
confession.
And even if an act could be forgiven, no one could 
bear  the  responsibility  of  forgiveness  on  behalf  of  the 
dead. No act of violence is ever resolved. When the one 
who can forgive can no longer speak, there is only silence.i
This parable is markedly similar, though not identical, to Abraham 
Joshua  Heschel’s  contribution  to  Simon  Wiesenthal’s  book,  The 
Sunflower;ii Heschel’s tale, in turn, is a brief gloss on a longer storyiii 
about Rabbi Chaim Soloveichik,   the Brisker Rav—an ancestor of 
Heschel’s  contemporary,  Joseph  Soloveitchik.iv In  the  version 
recorded by R. Hanoch Teller, the Brisker Rav goes on to explain:
They thought I was a plain, simple Jew […] and that’s why 
they acted the way they did. Had they known who I was, 
I’m certain they would never have behaved so heartlessly. 
The insult, therefore, was not directed at me, so I cannot 
forgive them. Their only hope of atonement lies in begging 
forgiveness from plain, simple Jews and in changing their 
attitude towards their humble brethren.v
In  Heschel’s  version,  the  Rav  is  considerably  briefer:  ‘He 
offended a common man. Let [him] go to [that man] and ask for 
forgiveness.’ Heschel, like Michaels, then expounds upon the moral 
of  the tale:  ‘No one can forgive crimes committed against other 
people […] According to Jewish tradition, even God Himself can only 
forgive sins committed against Himself, not against man.’
II.
This  parable  of  impossible  forgiveness  anticipates  Jacques 
Derrida,  whose  2001  essay  ‘On  Forgiveness’  maintains  that 
forgiveness only has meaning and  coherence as a discrete concept 
when  it  is  unconditional,  elided  neither  with  rehabilitation, 
forgetting, nor amnesty; when it is devoid of any trace of exchange, 
neither sought nor accompanied by any expression of repentance, 
and when the act to be forgiven is outside any ordinary economy of 
grace—that is to say, unforgiveable: ‘If I say, 'I forgive you on the 
condition that, asking forgiveness, you would thus have changed 
and would no longer be the same', do I forgive? What do I forgive? 
And whom?’vi 
In this scheme, it is not just the man on the train who has 
passed beyond reach, but also his fellow passengers, who through 
their repentance have ceased to be the people who tormented him; 
the  people  asking forgiveness  are  not  the  people  who  can  be 
forgiven, just as the man of whom they are asking it is not the one 
who can grant it. By the very act of asking they have removed the 
act from forgiveness’s reach. The Rabbi in the parable cannot, and 
does not, echo a certain first century Rabbi in saying ‘Go in peace, 
your sins are forgiven’.  We could  read this as a comforting turn: 
acknowledgement  of  a  wrong  by  itself  constitutes  a  repentance 
which obviates the need for forgiveness and renders it impossible 
by virtue of its superfluity. But if forgiveness does not erase the act, 
then neither does repentance; even such a cozy interpretation (and 
its  coziness runs quite contrary to the instincts of  most readers) 
offers  less of a pathway to normalisation of relations than it does a 
displacement of  the rupture from between you-and-I  to between 
that-one-and-that-other-one, both of whom are now beyond reach 
and therefore beyond redemption. 
This is an issue that shapes the well-worn stereotype of Jews 
and Judaism as harsh, legalistic,  and incapable of forgiveness: in 
most  Christian worldviews, nothing is beyond redemption, because 
Christian  theology  assumes  an  already-redeemed  world.  Even  if 
redemption is  postponed until  the eschaton,  it  remains a settled 
fact.  There  is  significant  debate  about  what  this  means,  and 
humanity’s responsibility, but that the fact of redemption is  seldom 
disputed.
Derrida’s  essay  contains  substantial  echoes  of  the  work  of 
Hannah Arendt—indeed, he cites (albeit glancingly) the fifth chapter 
of The Human Condition, and while he makes no direct reference to 
Responsibility and Judgement, the question of forgiveness that he 
explores  is  intimately  linked to  the  questions  of  guilt  and moral 
culpability  explored by  Arendt  therein.  A  collective,  Arendt  says, 
cannot be morally responsible, because a collective cannot actually 
act—only  individuals  can  do  so.  Claims  of  collective  guilt—guilt 
which adheres to an entire a society for actions undertaken ‘in their 
name’—are not only philosophically incoherent, but actually morally 
dangerous,  because they dilute responsibility  and obscure actual 
culpability: ‘Where all are guilty, nobody is.’vii 
Arendt admits a limited utility to speaking of collectives, but 
she highlights the fictive dimensions of such language: ‘collective 
ownership … is  a contradiction in terms’;viii ‘men cannot become 
citizens of  the world as they are citizens of  their  countries,  and 
social men cannot own collectively as family and household men 
own  their  private  property’;ix a  collective  cannot  bear  any 
responsibility  for  wrongs  done,  nor,  indeed,  make  any  claim 
regarding wrongs done against itself; a collective cannot promise, 
cannot forgive. A collective has no capacity for action. Rather, it is 
formed by, and in aid of, the actions of individuals; it ‘assumes, in 
the  case  of  many  men  mutually  bound  by  promises,  a  certain 
limited reality.’x 
It  is  this  state of  being an individual  among individuals  that 
Arendt means when she invokes the notion of plurality, a way of 
bridging the gap between man and men without falling into the trap 
of  erasing difference so often prompted by sloppy thinking about 
collectives. Our existence as members of a collective is a story that 
we tell about our lives in the world. In turn, the very fictivity of such 
a collective existence becomes part of the instability that individuals 
act to dispel through the medium of the promise:
The unpredictability which the act of making promises at 
least  partially  dispels  is  of  a  twofold  nature:  it  arises 
simultaneously out of the ‘darkness of the human heart’, 
that  is,  the  basic  unreliability  of  men  who  never  can 
guarantee today who they will be tomorrow, and out of the 
impossibility  of  foretelling  the  consequences  of  an  act 
within a community  of  equals  where everybody has the 
same capacity to act. xi
But at the same time, it  is  the existence of  an individual  among 
other  individuals  which  renders  the  entire  enterprise  of  human 
existence meaningful:
Man’s inability to rely upon himself or to have complete 
faith  in  himself  (which  is  the  same  thing)  is  the  price 
human beings pay for  freedom; and the impossibility  of 
remaining unique masters of what they do, of knowing its 
consequences  and  relying  upon  the  future,  is  the  price 
they pay for plurality and reality, for the joy of inhabiting 
together with others a world whose reality is guaranteed 
for each by the presence of all.xii
Here,  Arendt  figures  plurality  as  an  object  of  desire,  something 
which must be paid for in the currency of uncertainty which is then 
mitigated by the act of promising and the promise of forgiveness. 
This is an important slippage away from the treatment of plurality as 
the basic fact of human existence, which she presents at the start of 
The Human Condition. To understand the meaning of this we may 
perhaps, take a cue from the pairing of plurality with reality, which, 
while not subjected to the same development as a technical term, 
we can infer  to be a similarly  inescapable fact of  existence.  The 
suggestion is that even conditions which must be taken as given are 
still to be paid for; the basic fact of human existence is debt, from 
which all of human activity is an attempt to extricate ourselves. To 
whom that debt is owed, and whether it actually can ever be paid, 
are  questions  with  which  Arendt  does  not  engage  with,  in  that 
particular text, though they are crucial questions for my purposes in 
this  article:  the  payment  of  such  debts  literally  constitutes  the 
redemption of the world. 
III. 
This  discourse,  like  all  discourses  of  the  past  century,  is 
shadowed by the Holocaust, which is figured in the imaginations of 
all of my interlocutors as the paradigmatic unforgiveable, of which 
all  victims  have  passed  from  the  earth  and  no  other  dares 
contemplate forgiveness on their behalf, even if to forgive on behalf 
of another were possible. You must ask the man on the train—and 
all the men, and women, and children that were on the iconic trains 
that  arrived  at  the  gates  of  the  synechdochal  Auschwitz  (there 
weren’t  always  trains;  it  wasn’t  always  Auschwitz)  have  passed 
even  further  beyond  reach  than  Anne  Michaels’s  peasant,  who 
never existed at all.
Except, of course, they haven’t; while heartbreakingly small 
in number compared to the masses that entered into the system of 
ghettos and camps—not to mention those who did not make it even 
that far, victims of the mobile extermination units that operated on 
the Eastern Front or whose lives, like Walter Benjamin’s, ended in 
flight—not  all  victims  perished.  Some  survived;  in  spite  of  the 
rhetoric of incommensurability between the states of ‘victim’ and 
‘survivor’  first  popularised by  feminist  theorists,xiii the  fact  of  an 
individual’s continued existence does not erase past victimisation, 
any  more  than  victimisation  destroys  an  individual’s  capacity  to 
survive.  The  Holocaust  was  more  than  straightforward  state-
sponsored  murder;  it  was  the  industrialised  process  of 
dehumanisation  that  made  murder  on  such  a  scale  not  only 
possible,  but normal.xiv Thus, even if  one accepts that no person 
may forgive the ending of a life on behalf of the one whose life has 
ended, it does not follow that the Holocaust is unforgiveable in toto: 
there are survivors, who are capable—though in no way obligated—
of forgiving the specific wrongs done to them. 
Derrida  knows  this;  his  target  in  his  essay  is  specifically 
institutionalised forgiveness, that passes from a collective of victims 
to  a  collective  of  perpetrators,  upon the receipt  of  an adequate 
performance of apology, rather than from particular individuals to 
other particular individuals. This does not just have the effect of 
making the guilty less specifically guilty; the collapsing of individual 
experiences into a collective victimisation erases the narratives of 
survivors, and in so doing obviates the possibility of even partial 
forgiveness.  The  institutionalisation  of  forgiveness  thus 
accomplishes  the  final  erasure  that  the  original  offence  did  not. 
Derrida  focuses  his  critique  on  the  transactional  aspects  of 
institutionalised forgiveness,  but  I  suggest  that this  collapsing of 
identity  is  the  true  point  of  conceptual  incoherence.  We  are, 
perhaps, not that far apart in our analyses; the institutionalisation 
of  individual  relationships  into  economic  transactions  that  are 
replicated on a scale that can be imagined as global is, of course, 
one of the dominant features of late capitalism.
Nevertheless, Derrida’s focus on transactionalism leads him 
to slip,  without noting it,  between institutionalised and individual 
forgiveness, treating the latter not only as a model for, but actually 
interchangeable with, the former. This slippage is hardly unique to 
Derrida, as the use of the story of the Rabbi on the train as a model 
for  discussions  of  forgiveness  and the Holocaust,  such as  within 
Fugitive Pieces or The Sunflower, makes clear. But such slippage is 
not only problematic for its contribution to conceptual incoherence; 
the fact that the institutional processes which Derrida critiques are 
derived—explicitly  or  implicitly—from  Christian  structures  of 
confession,  pardon,  and  redemption,  also  contributes  to  the 
assumption of fundamental contrast between Jewish and Christian 
political  theologies,  in  which  Christianity  once  again  offers  an 
expansive  and  universalising  system from which  Jewish  thinkers 
must dissent.
This tension is also evident in Arendt’s work on forgiveness, 
again in fifth chapter of The Human Condition. Arendt takes as her 
model  the  words  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  who  she  hails  as  ‘[t]he 
discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs’: 
xv  ‘And if he trespass against thee seven times a day, and seven 
times  in  a  day  turn  again  to  thee,  saying,  I  repent;  thou  shalt 
forgive  him.’xvi  Unlike  Derrida,  who  discounts  such  everyday 
transactionalism  in  order  to  focus  on  forgiveness  applied  to 
unforgiveable acts, Arendt specifically excludes questions of radical 
evil from her discussion, noting that ‘according to Jesus, they will be 
taken care of  by God in the Last Judgment,  which plays no role 
whatsoever in life on earth’.xvii In contrast to Derrida, who asserts 
that ‘One could never, in the ordinary sense of the words, found a 
politics  or  law  on  forgiveness’,  Arendt  sees  forgiveness  as 
foundational  to  political  action:  the  concept  of  forgiveness  is 
necessary  in  order  to  mitigate  ‘the  irreversibility  and 
unpredictability of the process started by acting.’xviii 
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences 
of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it 
were,  be  confined  to  one  single  deed  from which  we 
could never recover; we would remain the victims of its 
consequences forever.xix   
Arendt grounds such forgiveness ‘for the sake of the person’ in the 
recognition of plurality, of being one human among many others 
engaged in the same enterprise of  being human, faced with the 
‘impossibility  of  foretelling  the  consequences  of  an  act  within  a 
community of equals where everybody has the same capacity to 
act’, which moves us to pardon, not for the sake of any particular 
person, but for the sake of personhood itself, out of sympathy for 
the dilemma of action, unpredictability, etc., that entangles us all. 
IV. THE MAN ON THE TRAIN, AGAIN
And so we return to the man on the train—or, more precisely, 
to the end of the story: Yom Kippur, ‘the Day of Awe when, it  is 
written, each man must forgive his fellow.’ There are two notions 
contained in this sentence which trouble my philosophical picture of 
forgiveness. The first is easy: it is written that each man [sic] must 
forgive his fellow. What sort of forgiveness is compelled by force of 
law—even holy law? None at all. 
On  this  point,  a  further  variation  on  the  parable  is  perhaps 
more helpful: Rabbi Yisrael Salanter was also insulted by a young 
man on a train; when they reached their destination and the youth 
saw the  men assembled  to  greet  the  Rabbi,  he  sought  pardon, 
which  the  Rabbi  granted  immediately.  They  engaged  in 
conversation whereupon Rav Salanter learned that the youth was 
hoping to become a schochet, and Rav Salanter took the youth into 
his  own  home  and  went  to  great  lengths  to  promote  his 
advancement;  when  the  youth  finally  managed  to  pass  his 
ordination  exams,  he  thanked the  Rabbi  and asked why he had 
shown such generosity. Salanter’s response is quite typical of the 
mussar movement, which he founded:
It  is  easy to say 'I  forgive you'.  But deep down, how 
does one really know if he still bears a grudge? […] The 
only way to remove a grudge is to take action. One who 
helps another develops a love for the one he aided. By 
helping  you,  I  created  a  true  love  which  is 
overwhelmingly more powerful than the words, 'I forgive 
you'.xx
The second issue is  slightly  less  obvious:  the  climax of  the  tale 
comes at Yom Kippur, when observant Jews gather together in the 
synagogue  to  atone  for  transgressions  against  God—and  it  is  a 
collective  atonement:  Ashamnu,  bagadnu,  gazalanu—we  have 
trespassed,  we  have dealt treacherously,  we have robbed. This is 
not a peculiarity of the Yom Kippur prayerbook, but rather a point at 
which  the  prayerbook  discloses  a  rather  tricky  point  of  Jewish 
theology:  unlike  the  Noachide  and  Abrahamic  covenants,  which 
were  agreed  between  God  and  a  single  individual  and  then 
inherited  by  the  descendants  of  that  individual,  the  Mosaic 
covenant  is  collective  from  the  moment  of  its  inception;  it  is 
between God and  kal  Yisrael,  the  entirety  of  the  Jewish  people, 
‘those who are standing here today in the presence of the Lord and 
those who are not here’  (Deut 29:15). According to the liturgical 
logic, a collective covenant is a collective responsibility: when one 
individual fails to uphold it, all are required to atone, if not for direct 
transgression then for failure to prevent the transgression of others.
The  collective  responsibility  which  underlies  the  Yom Kippur 
liturgy is, however, quite different from the collective responsibility 
which  Arendt  and  Derrida  argue  against.  The  collective 
responsibility assumed in institutionalised forgiveness, in which a 
single figure (usually an elected official)  speaks on behalf  of  the 
totality of a society is a diffusion of responsibility, from individuals 
who chose to participate in specific actions, to a generalised social 
structure in which things ‘just happen’. The liturgy of Yom Kippur 
represents  a  re-distribution  of  responsibility  from  a  generalised 
collective back to individuals; the plural form of the verbs used does 
not negate the fact that each member of the community confesses 
as one human being among others, an individual bound up directly 
in responsibility to and for other individuals, out of sympathy for the 
dilemmas of action, unpredictability, and covenantal obligation that 
entangle all. 
Forgiveness, then, is  not forgetting, amnesty, or exchange, but 
instead recognition: a recognition of our own susceptibility to error, 
a  susceptibility  which  necessarily  passes  into  our  systems  and 
institutions, in spite of our best efforts to guard against it. Absent 
this recognition, our attempts at enacting justice will not only fail, 
but be compounded in their  failure by a confusion regarding the 
locus of responsibility, leading to the erasure of individual actions 
and identities.  The redemption of  the world does not come from 
outside of the world, but from recognising ourselves as inescapably 
part of the world.
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